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NOTE
HORMONE THERAPY FOR INMATES: A
METONYM FOR TRANSGENDER RIGHTS
Silpa Maruri*
The issue of hormone therapy for transgender inmates, while seem-
ingly limited in importance, is one that involves issues of greater impor-
tance for the transgender community. The greatest issue at the heart of
the matter is the legal argument that is traditionally used to gain access
to hormone therapy: the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment
prohibits deliberate indifference to the medical needs of inmates. Tradi-
tionally, transgender inmates have gained access to hormone therapy by
appealing to the DSM-IV's classification of Gender Identity Disorder
(GID) as a mental illness, and by establishing that prison officials'fail-
ure to provide hormone therapy constitutes deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need. However, appeal to GID is a double-edged
sword: while it allows access to hormone therapy, it does so by describ-
ing transgender individuals as somehow sick or infirm. This description
is at odds with the transgender community's conceptualization of itself
This Note seeks to square the legal arguments for provision of hormone
therapy to transgender inmates with the philosophical backdrop that
shapes the transgender rights movement by using Plyler v. Doe as a
model. This Note argues that access to hormone therapy by transgender
inmates involves the intersection of a quasi-fundamental right with a
quasi-suspect class. By utilizing such an argument, the transgender
community is not bound by the negative expressive effect that the law
may have in describing it as infirm or deficient.
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In 2002, convicted killer Michelle Kosilek sued the Massachusetts
Department of Corrections to pay for her sexual reassignment surgery.
As a transgender female, Kosilek wanted to realize the physical anatomy
of a female while in prison. Sensational headlines and blog-posts read
"Cross-Dressing Killer Wants You to Pay for Hair-Removal Treatments
Behind Bars,"' and "Transsexual Murderer Robert Kosilek Is Still
Whining." 2
Stories such as these evoke the ire and disdain of the public and
politicians. In Wisconsin, political opposition to hormone therapy was
so strong that the state passed a statute imposing a categorical ban on the
provision of hormone therapy to inmates.3 Responding to the statute, the
ACLU filed suit in 2007 on behalf of two transgender inmates in Wis-
consin,4 and in 2010, a district court ultimately found the statute uncon-
1 Ryan Smith, Cross-Dressing Killer Robert Kosilek Wants You to Pay for Hair Re-
moval Behind Bars, CBS NEWS CRIMESIDERS BLOG (Nov. 23, 2009, 1:51 PM), http://
www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-5748570-504083.html.
2 Van Helsing, Transsexual Murderer Robert Kosilek Is Still Whining, MOONBATTERY
BLOG (Mar. 3, 2008, 9:16 AM), http://www.moonbattery.com/archives/2008/03/transsexual
mur.html.
3 WIs. STAT. § 302.386(5m)(b) (2006).
4 See Sundstrom v. Frank-Case Profile, AM. C.L. UNION, http://www.aclu.orglgbt-
rights.hiv-aids/sundstrom-v-frank-case-profile (last visited Nov. 29, 2010).
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stitutional.5  This case and others like it6 underscore the status of
transgender rights in general, and finding a suitable model for addressing
the treatment of transgender prisoners is critical to understanding trans-
gender rights in the evolving modem context.
This Note analyzes a major problem facing the transgender prison
community: the provision of hormone therapy. Traditional analysis of
transgender rights has opted to advocate for civil rights by (a) appealing
to the idea that transgender persons constitute a suspect class, (b) arguing
that limitations on transgender persons constitute a violation of their fun-
damental right to sexuality, and (c) arguing a violation of the Eighth
Amendment. 7 This Note undertakes a different approach: it advocates
for viewing a transgender inmate's right to hormone therapy through the
lens of Plyler v. Doe8 and argues in favor of viewing transgender inmates
and access to hormone therapy as the intersection between a quasi-sus-
pect class and a quasi-fundamental right. Part I explains why the issue of
hormone therapy availability warrants analysis and provides background
on accessibility problems. Part II describes and highlights the problems
with the traditional approaches applied to transgender rights in the con-
text of transgender inmates' rights to hormone therapy while incarcer-
ated. Part III posits a new approach to the problem of hormone therapy
by applying Plyler v. Doe. The final Part is a conclusion.
I. THE CONTEXT FOR HORMONE THERAPY
A. Why Analyze Transgender Inmates' Rights to Hormone Therapy?
Before an analysis of transgender inmates' rights may begin, one
must address the question of why legal scholars should analyze the prob-
lem of access to hormone. It may not be clear how many individuals,
directly or immediately, benefit from a discourse that addresses the prob-
lem of the access to hormone therapy in prisons for transgender inmates.
Admittedly, the number of transgender inmates who occupy the prison
system is uncertain. 9 In the general population alone, it is notoriously
difficult to estimate how many individuals are transgender, and there are
no statistics available as to the number of transgender inmates within the
5 See generally Fields v. Smith (Fields I), No. 06-C-i 12, 2010 WL 1929819 (E.D. Wis.
May 13, 2010) (finding Wisconsin's statute facially unconstitutional under the Eighth Amend-
ment and under the Equal Protection Clause's rational basis review).
6 See, e.g., Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1986); Brooks v. Berg, 270 F.
Supp. 2d 302 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 195 (D. Mass.
2002).
7 U.S. CONsr. amend Vffl.
8 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
9 George R. Brown & Everett McDuffie, Health Care Policies Addressing Transgender
Inmates in Prison Systems in the United States, 15 J. CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE 280, 281
(2009).
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federal prison system. Nonetheless, some data may be instructive on the
scope of the population. One study on the characteristics of individuals
leaving the New York City Department of Corrections found that 0.6%
of adult males in the prison systems self-identified as transgender.' 0 An-
other study noted that there are likely between 500-750 transgender in-
mates in custody in state facilities, as well as another 50-100 in federal
facilities." These numbers, however, may underestimate the total num-
ber of transgender prisoners because many inmates are "undiagnosed."' 2
While transgender persons are overrepresented in prisons when com-
pared to the population at large,13 the number of transgender inmates is
small relative to the total prison population.14 Given that the transgender
inmate population represents such a small proportion of the prison popu-
lation, why address the argument over transgender prisoners' constitu-
tional right to hormone therapy?
Aside from the obvious argument that personal rights matter regard-
less of how many individuals are adversely affected by their denial, the
issue of prisoners' rights to hormone therapy has greater expressive value
for the transgender population as a whole. The denial of hormone ther-
apy implicates a greater historical struggle within the transgender com-
munity as to autonomy in self-definition. Generally, transgender
advocates seek to assert the rights of transgender individuals through ar-
guments that transgender individuals constitute a suspect class or are ex-
ercising a fundamental right;15 these arguments are usually unsuccessful.
As a historical matter, the only means by which inmates have accessed
hormone therapy is through the appeal to the prohibitions of the Eighth
Amendment, by arguing that the denial of hormone therapy amounts to
deliberate indifference to the medical needs of transgender inmates. 16
This argument relies on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorder (DSM-IV)'s classification of Gender Identity Disorder (GID) as
a mental illness, by positing that prison officials act with deliberate indif-
10 Nicholas Freudenberg et al., Comparison of Health and Social Characteristics of Peo-
ple Leaving New York City Jails by Age, Gender, and Race/Ethnicity: Implications for Public
Health Interventions, 122 PUB. HEALTH RE. 733, 739 (2007).
11 See Brown & McDuffie, supra note , at 281.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 282 (finding that at least 750 inmates were in custody in 2007).
14 See id. (noting that an estimated 2,193,798 inmates were in custody in the United
States in 2005).
15 See, e.g., Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215 (1st Cir. 2000)
(finding that male plaintiff dressed in traditional female attire could gain protection under
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)); Schwenk v. Harford, 204 F.3d 1187,
1203 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that transgender persons should be given protection under federal
sex discrimination laws).
16 See, e.g., Fields 1, 2010 WL 1929819 at *36 (E.D. Wis. May 13, 2010); Brooks v.
Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 310 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); Phillips v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 731 F.
Supp. 792, 800 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
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ference when they fail to acknowledge the disorder. However, such an
argument implicates the larger concerns of the transgender community
over the mainstream population's perception of transgender identity. As
Judith Butler notes, "To be diagnosed with gender identity disorder is to
be found, in some way, to be ill, sick, wrong, out of order, abnormal, and
to suffer a certain stigmatization as a consequence of the diagnosis being
given at all." 17 Thus, transgender activists and progressive psychiatrists
have argued that the diagnosis should be eliminated altogether and that
transgender individuals should be considered to be engaging in an act of
self-determination, an exercise of autonomy.18
Thus, the problem becomes one of squaring the philosophical back-
drop that shapes the transgender movement with the desire to acquire
legal rights. The scientific model assumes that uncontrollable forces af-
fect the diagnosed individual, who suffers from delusion or dysphoria.19
Because the presumption here is that there is error in not having gender
norms take root as they normally "should," this approach seeks to uphold
norms as currently constituted.2 0 In the context of the prison system,
individuals have often been asked to demonstrate a medical need for hor-
mone therapy; thus, to attain rights, they must engage the language of the
DSM-IV. The problem for transgender inmates is therefore emblematic
of the problem for the transgender population as a whole: "one purchases
one sort of freedom only by giving up another." 21 Thus, finding a solu-
tion to the problem of hormone therapy for transgender inmates is part of
a larger project of articulating a legal solution to transgender rights that
both addresses theorization of transgender identity by the transgender
community and simultaneously constitutes a legally viable argument to
secure rights.
B. Background
Transgender inmates are a vulnerable population within the prison
system. The penal system typically classifies and houses pre-operative
17 Judith Butler, Undiagnosing Gender, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTs 274-75 (Paisley Cur-
rah et al. eds., 2006).
18 Id. at 275.
19 Id.
20 See id.
21 Id. at 288. Butler writes:
[T]he only way to secure the means by which to start this transformation is learning
how to present yourself in a discourse that is not yours, a discourse that effaces in
you in the act of representing you . . . . In acquiring the ability to have an operation,
the transgender loses the very thing that he or she seeks: the ability to define him or
herself according to his or her own terms. Instead he or she must speak in the
language of disease, describing him or herself as a person with an illness.
Id.
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transgender prisoners according to their birth gender.22 In addition to
being the targets of sexual abuse,23 transgender inmates present a myriad
of practical issues, including confrontation with rules regarding health-
care, clothing, and makeup.24 The medical and psychiatric needs of the
transgender population undergoing hormone therapy presents particular
problems. Transgender inmates are more likely to suffer from depres-
sion, anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder, schizophrenia, and substance
abuse problems. 25 Denial of hormone therapy, in particular, presents is-
sues for the transgender inmate population. According to the psychiatric
community, autocastration, which has potentially lethal consequences, is
often the consequence of failure to receive hormone therapy. 26 In at least
six facilities in four states, transgender inmates have castrated themselves
while incarcerated. 27
The traditional response of the psychiatric community and prison
officials, when the problem has been acknowledged, is to require advo-
cates of providing hormone therapy to appeal to GID, classified as a
mental illness by the American Psychiatric Association (APA). 28 Ac-
cording to the APA, the symptoms of GID are: (1) a strong and persistent
cross-gender identification manifested by symptoms such as a stated de-
sire to be the other sex, frequent passing as the other sex, desire to live or
be treated as the other sex, or conviction that he or she has the typical
feelings and reactions of the other sex; (2) persistent discomfort with his
or her sex or senses of inappropriateness in the role of that sex mani-
fested by symptoms such as preoccupation with getting rid of primary
and secondary sex characteristics; (3) the disturbance is not concurrent
with a physical intersex conditions; and (4) the condition causes clini-
cally significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other
important areas of functioning. 29 The treatment that psychiatrists tradi-
22 NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, RIGHTS OF TRANSGENDER PRISONERS 1 (2006),
available at http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/RightsofrransgenderPrisoners.pdf?doc
ID=6381.
23 See Darren Rosenblum, Trapped in Sing Sing: Transgendered Prisoners Caught in the
Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 517-23 (2000); see also Brown & McDuffie,
supra note 9, at 288 ("Transgender inmates also have concerns that include safe housing, the
potential for physical and sexual assault from other residents as well as caretakers, and privacy
issues." (internal citations omitted)).
24 See Brown & McDuffie, supra note 9, at 280.
25 Id. at 287.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 288 (noting that while cost may be a consideration in denying hormone therapy,
the cost of caring for individuals who autocastrate themselves is also great).
28 AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISOR-
DERS IV 532 (4th ed. 1994).
29 David Seil, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Transgendered Patients, 8 J. GAY &
LESBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY 99, 100 (2004); see also Fields v. Smith, No. 06-C-112, 2010 WL
1929819, at *2 (E.D. Wis. May 13, 2010) (explaining one transgendered inmate's reaction to
being denied hormone medication).
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tionally prescribe for GID is a period of therapy, followed by the pre-
scription of hormone therapy, and observation of the subjective
impression of the changes that occur during hormone therapy.30 In some
instances, where the psychiatrist finds it appropriate, surgery may also be
prescribed.3 1 As a result of this traditional analysis, most successful at-
tempts at attaining legal rights have been accomplished through resorts to
psychiatry.
II. ANALYZING THE ADVANTAGES AND PROBLEMS OF
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
This section provides a review of the traditional means for securing
transgender persons' rights, and discusses the potential problems with the
application of these approaches to transgender prisoners' rights to hor-
mone therapy.
A. Treating Transgender Identity as a Suspect Classification
Several attempts have been made to fit transgender identity within
the parameters of a suspect classification, in order to allow persons con-
sidered transgender to gain protection under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause. In some states, courts have found that
transgender persons are protected under the state's civil rights laws that
prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability. 32 However, many are
hesitant to use disability laws in order to gain protection. Transgender
advocates argue that "using the legal category of disability to secure le-
gal protections for transgender people will perpetuate social myths and
stereotypes that transgender people are sick, abnormal, or inferior." 33
Others argue that the framework of seeking rights through disability pro-
tections is valid, positing that the modem conception of disability re-
volves around the distinction between impairments and disabilities;
impairments involve the loss of capacity to perform in some way, but
disabilities are the product of the ambient society's construction of
barriers. 34
There are several problems, however, that such an argument en-
counters. First, many transgender advocates object to the usage of disa-
bility laws as a means of protection because of the stigma associated with
30 See Seil, supra note 29, at 103.
31 See id.
32 Jennifer L. Levi & Bennett H. Klein, Pursuing Protection for Transgender People
Through Disability Laws, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra note 17, at 74; see, e.g., Lie v. Sky
Publ'g Corp., 15 Mass. L. Rptr. 412 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2002); Enriquez v. W. Jersey Health
Sys., 777 A.2d 365 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
33 Levi & Klein, supra note 32, at 74.
34 Id. at 79 (quoting LENNARD J. DAVIS, BENDING OVER BACKWARDS: DISABILITY, Dis-
MODERNISM, AND OTHER DuFncuLr PosrnoNs 41 (2002)).
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the term "disability."35 Furthermore, when Congress passed the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990, it explicitly excluded from the
definition of disability "transsexualism" and "gender identity disorders
not resulting from physical impairments." 3 6 While one may argue that
state statutes do not contain the same explicit exclusion, many state laws
utilize the same language as the ADA in their own disability statutes.37
Moreover, the requirements for satisfying the terms of many disability
statutes would serve as a severe impediment to many transgender indi-
viduals because many of the statutes require that an individual fulfill one
of three requirements: (1) have a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits major life activity, (2) have "a record of such an impair-
ment," or (3) be regarded as having such an impairment.38 While some
transgender persons might be able to satisfy these criteria, even propo-
nents of this approach agree that many might not be able to fall under
any of the three requirements. 39
Other advocates argue for protecting transgender persons through
the use of statutory protections afforded on the bases of "sex" and "gen-
der." These advocates argue that discrimination and unfavorable treat-
ment because of transgender identity is in fact discrimination on the basis
of gender, in that individuals are discriminated against because they fail
to conform to stereotypes and expectations about gender. In particular,
such advocates appeal to Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,40 in which the
Court found that an employer had violated Title VII's safeguard against
discrimination on the basis of sex when it refused to grant partnership to
a woman, in part because her demeanor, appearance, and personality
were deemed not sufficiently feminine.41 While courts were initially re-
luctant to afford protection to transsexual and transgender persons under
Price Waterhouse, new decisions reflect an increasing willingness to do
so.42
However, this argument runs into the problematic decision of
Romer v. Evans,43 in which the Court analyzed whether homosexuals
were entitled to a higher level of scrutiny under Equal Protection analy-
35 Cf Judith Butler, Undiagnosing Gender, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 274-75 (Paisley
Currah et al. eds., 2006).
36 Levi & Klein, supra note 32, at 83.
37 Id. at 84.
38 Id.
39 See id. at 87 ("It is important to acknowledge that pursuing protections under disabil-
ity law may not protect all transgender people.").
40 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
41 See id. at 258; Kylar W. Broadus, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Pro-
tections for Transgender People, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra note 17, at 93.
42 See, e.g., Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000); Schwenk
v. Harford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
43 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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sis. In Romer, while purporting to apply rational basis scrutiny to homo-
sexuals, the Court made distinctions that suggested that it was not purely
applying rational basis scrutiny.44 For example, the Court seriously ex-
amined the stated objective of the statute,4 5 an unusual approach under
rational basis scrutiny. Further, for the first time, the Court articulated
the rule that a statute that is "at once too narrow and too broad" con-
founds judicial review.46 Consequently, the language of Romer does
suggest some sort of elevated form of judicial review for homosexuals,
but this elevated review still does not rise to the level of intermediate or
strict scrutiny.4 7 Given that rational basis is the level of scrutiny af-
forded to homosexuals, it seems unlikely that courts would afford trans-
gender persons intermediate scrutiny, based upon the argument that
transgender identity is the product of gender. To the extent that circuit
court interpretations of Title VII suggest that "sex" and "gender," as used
in the statutory context, encompass transgender identity, 48 it is unclear
whether the Supreme Court would construe the terms in the same way.
Consequently, although treating transgender identity as a suspect
classification would greatly advance the cause of transgender prisoner
treatment, it is unlikely that transgendered persons would constitute a
suspect classification warranting strict or intermediate scrutiny. While
the fundamental rights regime is considerably limited in the context of
incarceration, Equal Protection remains a powerful doctrine within the
prison context. The Court has found that racial discrimination, for exam-
ple, is unconstitutional in prisons except in extreme circumstances for the
preservation of prison security and discipline. 4 9 However, given the un-
likelihood of the Court finding transgender individuals constitute a sus-
pect class, this doctrine is a problematic for the advancement transgender
rights.
B. Treating Transgender Identity as a Part of the Fundamental Right
to Sexual Identity
In contrast to Equal Protection, application of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a means of securing transgender
prisoners' rights to hormone therapy suffers from the opposite problem.
44 See id. at 635.
45 See id. ("Amendment 2, however, in making a general announcement that gays and
lesbians shall not have any particular protections from the law, inflicts on them immediate,
continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate justifications that may be
claimed for it.").
46 Id. at 633.
47 See id. at 635.
48 See, e.g., Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Comm. Coll. Dist., 325 Fed. Appx. 492 (9th Cir.
2009).
49 See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972).
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While it is, as a matter of doctrine, more likely that the Court would
recognize a fundamental right to autonomy in sexual self-definition, it is
simultaneously less likely that this fundamental right would yield signifi-
cant protection in the prison context, given that the exercise of funda-
mental rights in prisons is severely constrained.50
Transgender advocates view the ruling in Lawrence v. Texas,5'
which may be argued to have secured a fundamental right to autonomy
for sexual self-definition, as constituting a basis for protection for trans-
gender individuals. In Lawrence, the Court held that a Texas statute ban-
ning homosexual sodomy was unconstitutional. 52 There is debate over
the level of scrutiny that the Court applied when it famously declared
that, "[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with
another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond
that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows
homosexual persons the right to make this choice."53 While it is unclear
what level of review the Court applied in that instance,54 the Court rec-
ognized some form of respect for relational and sexual autonomy. Fur-
ther, in the Lawrence opinion, the Court highlighted its own history of
respecting personal autonomy. The Court noted that in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,55 it had declared, "[a]t the heart of liberty is the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni-
verse, of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under the com-
pulsion of the State." 5 6 Thus, the language of Lawrence and Casey
points to the recognition of a right, if not necessarily a fundamental right,
to personal, sexual autonomy.
In dissecting the Court's opinion in Lawrence, Laurence Tribe noted
that while the Court did not explicitly say that it was applying strict scru-
tiny, its standard of review "could hardly have been more obvious."57
50 See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
51 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
52 Id. at 567.
53 Id.
54 See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1893, 1916 (2004) (alluding to the Court's "'mysterious'
standard" of review).
55 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
56 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
57 Tribe, supra note 54, at 1917. To the extent that Tribe posits that the Court did not
undertake merely rational basis review in deciding Lawrence, however, he also suggests that
the Supreme Court was approaching due process in an ultimately different way than it ever
has. He notes:
In deciding that the laws banning sodomy should be so regarded, the Lawrence ma-
jority did not articulate a doctrinal "test" as such, or even a specific mode of analy-
sis, but-as perhaps befits a Court more comfortable with the exposition of common
law than with the construction of theory-it laid down markers that future courts
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Further, other commentators have posited that a fundamental right to de-
termine one's gender exists.58 In particular, these commentators argue
that Lawrence and Casey guarantee autonomy, in terms of self-expres-
sion, as a fundamental right.59 Along the same lines, recent case law
generated by "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT) also suggests that discus-
sions of sexuality, apart from obscenity, are protected by both due pro-
cess and the First Amendment's,60 further suggesting a fundamental right
to sexual self-expression.
However, to the extent that such a model is an operative means of
viewing transgender rights, this model may not aid transgender prisoners.
Prison, by definition, allows the deprivation of certain fundamental
rights. Incarceration inherently infringes upon fundamental rights, par-
ticularly the right to be free from physical restraint. 61 The general in-
quiry used to determine whether infringement of a fundamental right in
the prison context is appropriate is two-pronged: (1) whether the right is
fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration, and (2) whether the prison
regulation abridging that right is reasonably related to legitimate, peno-
logical interests. 62 If the right claimed in the first prong is fundamentally
inconsistent with incarceration, the inquiry ends and the second prong
need not be explored. To avoid a finding of fundamental inconsistency,
might retrace and extend less through abstract speculation than by the light of un-
folding experience.
Id. at 1943.
58 See Laura K. Langley, Note, Self-Determination in a Gender Fundamentalist State:
Toward Legal Liberation of Transgender Identities, 12 TEX. J. C.L & C.R. 101, 123-26 (2006)
(noting that "[w]hen the state interferes with this process of self-definition, or prevents gender
self-determination entirely, it violates the constitutionally based right to liberty because of the
dramatic extent to which personhood is abused by institutionalized denials of the opportunity
to self-actualize"). See also Franklin H. Romeo, Beyond a Medical Mode: Advocating for a
New Conception for Gender Identity in the Law, 36 COLUM. Hum. RTS. L. REv. 713 (2005):
Like pregnancy, a person's experience of gender is intimately connected to that per-
son's experience of their body and affects the most profound personal choices they
make in life. A reproductive rights analogy could provide a useful framework
through which courts could conceive of gender in a way that . . . acknowledges that
gender-like pregnancy-is a healthy aspect of life that presents fundamental issues
of bodily integrity and personal choice, which every person has an inherent interest
in self-determining.
Id. at 745.
59 These arguments fail to take into account that the articulation of sexual practices was
not described as a fundamental right explicitly in the text of Lawrence, and the language from
Casey that supports such an interpretation provides only a vague allusion to self-definition.
60 See Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, No. CV 04-08425-VAP (ex), slip op., at
74, 75 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2010) (describing how DADT's ban on discussions of sexual orien-
tation violated both the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause). Recent legislative
action repealing "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" moots the case, as a practical matter, for the purposes
of the policy, but its language still suggests an important relationship between the First
Amendment and sexual expression.
61 See Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2002).
62 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-97 (1987).
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four factors must be met: (1) a valid, rational connection between the
prison regulation and the legitimate, neutral government interest put for-
ward to justify it, (2) the existence of alternative means of exercising the
right available to inmates, (3) the impact that accommodation of the as-
serted constitutional right will have on guards, other inmates, and the
allocation of prison resources generally, and (4) the absence of readily
available alternatives to the prison for achieving the governmental
objectives. 63
Thus, with respect to whether the prison context requires prison of-
ficials to respect a fundamental right to sexual self-definition, the first
question is whether the right is fundamentally inconsistent with incarcer-
ation. Gerber v. Hickman64 is instructive on this point.65 In Gerber, the
court examined whether due process required a prison warden to allow
an inmate to mail a specimen of his sperm to his wife for the purposes of
artificial insemination.66 The court found the right to procreate was fun-
damentally inconsistent with the prison setting. 67 In so finding, the court
noted that separation from family and friends, and consequently the right
to intimate association, is necessarily infringed by imprisonment. 68 Fur-
ther, in Kentucky Dep't. of Corrections v. Thompson,69 the Court held
that government agents could restrict a prisoner's rights to meet with a
particular visitor without a violation of the Due Process Clause. 70 Fur-
ther, it is well settled that prisoners have no constitutional right to conju-
gal visits.7 1 Although these cases establish that not all fundamental
rights are preserved in the prison context, important in these cases is the
rationale that imprisonment necessitates a barrier to relational contact as
it exists in the outside world. The problem of transgender inmates is
unlike an issue of relational liberty, and is rather a problem of fundamen-
tal self-definition, as it involves not one's relationship with others, but
rather one's relationship to self.
Consequently, because hormone therapy is about an individual's ex-
pression of gender identity, the case law on prisoners' rights to free
speech under the First Amendment might be more instructive than the
relational-rights case law. In the prison context, a court determines
whether the prisoner's First Amendment claims are inconsistent with the
63 Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229-30 (2001).
64 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002).
65 Id. at 621.
66 See id. at 620.
67 See id. at 621-22.
68 See id. at 620.
69 490 U.S. 454 (1989).
70 Id. at 461 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983)).
71 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1994); Davis v. Carlson,
837 F.2d 1318, 1319 (5th Cir. 1988).
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status of a prisoner or with the legitimate penal objectives of the correc-
tions system.72 In the past, although the Court has admitted that there is
no absolute bar on the exercise of speech in prisons, most First Amend-
ment claims that have proceeded to the Supreme Court have been unsuc-
cessful.73 Likewise, inherently problematic to the claim that gender
identity is a fundamental right in the prison context is the limitation on
access to fundamental rights in prisons. As a result, the fundamental
rights regime suffers from the opposite problem as Equal Protection:
while Equal Protection carries great weight in the prison context, it is not
likely to apply to transgender persons; a fundamental right to autonomy
in sexual self-definition likely exists, yet it is unlikely to have efficacy in
the prison context.
C. The Most Common Argument: Failure to Provide Prisoners with
Hormone Therapy Violates the Eighth Amendment
Advocates for providing hormone therapy to transgender prisoners
most commonly argue that the failure to do so violates the Eighth
Amendment. The Eighth Amendment provides protection from "cruel
and unusual punishment," 74 and a prison official violates the Eighth
Amendment if she commits an act or omission accompanied by "deliber-
ate indifference" to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate.75 The
deliberate indifference standard requires that a prison official, in so act-
ing or failing to act, have knowledge of the risk of harm.76 Whether a
prison official had the requisite knowledge of the substantial risk is a
question of fact litigants may prove by circumstantial evidence, and the
fact-finder may conclude that the prison official knew of substantial risk
from the fact that the risk was obvious.77 With respect to psychiatric
care, the deliberate indifference standard is more difficult to reach. To
meet the deliberate indifference standard, a litigant must show: (1) a seri-
ous disease or injury; (2) that such disease or injury is curable or may be
substantially alleviated; and (3) the potential for harm to the prisoner
resulting from delay or denial of care would be substantial.78
The application of the deliberate indifference standard to the rights
of transgender prisoners has become more liberal with the passage of
time. Initially, litigants did not succeed in arguments based on the
Eighth Amendment for access to transgender hormone therapy in pris-
72 See Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 822 (1974)).
73 See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006); Shaw, 532 U.S. at 229.
74 U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
75 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994).
76 Id.
77 See id.
78 Bowring v. E. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1976).
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ons.79 For example, in Supre v. Ricketts, the court held that the state of
Colorado did not need to administer estrogen therapy to a transgender
inmate to satisfy the State's duty of care to prisoners.80 Gradually, how-
ever, the tide began to turn and some cases established that transgender
prisoners were entitled to "some kind of medical care" but did not articu-
late the extent of that treatment.8' In Kosilek v. Maloney, for example,
the court maintained a moderate approach, holding that although prison
officials did not provide adequate care for a serious medical need, the
inmate failed to show that the lack of care was the result of the official's
deliberate indifference. 82 Nevertheless, the court held that as a result of
the litigation, prison officials were on notice of the inmate's medical
need and had a duty to provide the inmate with adequate medical
treatment. 83
Later cases, however, found that failure to supply transgender in-
mates with hormone therapy violated the Eighth Amendment. In Brooks
v. Berg,84 the court held that the plaintiffs GID was a serious medical
condition and prison officials failed to prove that they had given the
plaintiff adequate medical treatment.85 Similarly, in Phillips v. Michigan
Department of Corrections,86 the court ordered prison officials to rein-
state hormone therapy for a transgender inmate, distinguishing between
the withdrawal of hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery: the
court described the former as the reversal of "healing medical treatment,"
and the latter as an improvement of medical condition.87 Most recently,
in Fields v. Smith,88 a district court held that a Wisconsin statute, barring
prison doctors from prescribing hormone therapy or sex reassignment
surgery to inmates in state custody, was unconstitutional. 89
As these various court opinions suggest, the major issues that an
argument based on the Eighth Amendment encounters are similar to
79 See, e.g., Maggert v. Hinks, 131 F.3d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment does not entitle an inmate to treatment for a gender identity disorder); Lamb v.
Maschner, 633 F. Supp. 351, 353-54 (D. Kan. 1986).
80 792 F.2d 958, 962-63 (10th Cir. 1986).
81 See, e.g., Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F. 2d 408, 414 (7th Cir. 1987).
82 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 195 (D. Mass. 2002).
83 See id at 193.
84 270 F. Supp. 2d 302 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (vacated in part).
85 See Id. at 308-10. The court vacated this decision after the defendants conceded the
plaintiff was entitled to medical care but pleaded that they did not adequately address the
issues before the court. Nevertheless, the grounds for vacating the judgment had little to do
with the merits; instead, the court vacated the judgment in the interest of judicial economy, so
that the defendants could resubmit their arguments. See Brooks v. Berg, 289 F. Supp. 2d 286,
289 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
86 731 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Mich. 1990), affid, 932 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991).
87 See id. at 800.
88 712 F. Supp. 2d 830 (E.D. Wis. 2010), modified, July 9, 2010).
89 See id. at 841.
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those encountered in defining transgender persons as disabled. Specifi-
cally, in terms of the expressive effect of the law, defining transgender
identity as a psychological disorder is problematic because of society's
overall misconception of the transgender community.90 As discussed
earlier,91 the arguments made in order to secure treatment under the
Eighth Amendment rely heavily on an appeal to GID.
The Fields court, for example, evaluated the constitutionality of a
statute that banned the provision of hormone therapy to inmates, focus-
ing on medical need and the importance of individualized evaluation of
transgender inmates, and found that some inmates might require hor-
mone therapy. 92 The court specifically focused on the fact that in some
instances "the disorder is so intense and severe" that some inmates suffer
from symptoms like "anxiety, irritability, suicidal ideation, suicide at-
tempts, and self-mutilation or autocastration," meaning that because of
the statute, inmates that might have medically required hormone therapy
were not receiving it.93 Similarly, in Phillips, the court focused on the
healing effects of hormone therapy, and the possibility that denying hor-
mone therapy could reverse the positive effects of past hormone
treatments. 94
The transgender community has attempted to distinguish its reliance
on the Eighth Amendment in order to secure access to hormone therapy
and to avoid criticisms that this plays into mainstream fears that trans-
gender persons are abnormal and that their condition derives from psy-
chological disorder.95 The main distinction the transgender community
uses in order to retain the benefits accrued by considering transgenderism
a medical condition is between considering transsexualism "a medical
rather than a psychiatric status." 96 Recognizing that a diagnosis of GID
remains necessary to get hormone therapy and surgery, even outside the
prison context, the transgender community has struggled with the idea of
advocating against GID.9 7 As a consequence, GID and its relationship to
the Eighth Amendment remains a complicated problem, implicating the
90 See Butler, supra note 17, at 275 (noting that in seeking treatments through appeals to
GID, the transgender person loses power over self-definition).
91 See supra notes 17 to 21 and accompanying text.
92 See Fields 1, 2010 WL 1929819 at *32 (E.D. Wis. May 13, 2010) (finding that the act
is facially unconstitutional under Eighth Amendment analysis because "[t]he statute applies
irrespective of an inmate's serious medical need or the DOC's clinical judgment").
93 Id. at *30.
94 See Phillips v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 731 F. Supp. 792, 800 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
95 See Shannon Minter & Phyllis Randolph Frye, A Joint Statement by the International
Conference on Transgender Law and Employment Policy (ICTLEP) and The National Center
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tension between the desire of transgender people to access the means to
achieve self-definition through transitioning and the compromise of self-
definition that transgender people must make by accepting a GID
dignosis. 98
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The above descriptions suggest that transgender activists have en-
countered difficulty in finding a comfortable home for transgender rights
that presents both a viable legal argument and does not involve the stig-
matizing label of "illness." This section proffers a possible solution to
this problem, finding a place for this nomadic issue. It argues that a
transgender prisoner's right to hormone therapy involves the intersection
of a quasi-suspect class with a quasi-fundamental right.
The doctrine described in Plyler v. Doe99 is an unusual home for
transgender rights in many respects. First, Plyler itself is a doctrine of
questionable value, and many scholars have questioned its continuing
viability.100 Second, outside of purely justifying the doctrine itself, the
application of Plyler to the present case must be supported. Finally, as-
suming Plyler is a viable home for transgender rights, one must question
whether recognizing that hormone therapy involves the intersection be-
tween a quasi-fundamental right and a quasi-suspect class will actually
impose an obligation on prisons to provide hormone therapy. These dis-
tinct problems are the subject of the following subsections.
A. Justifying Plyler v. Doe
In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court struck down a state statute that
denied funding for the education of children of illegal immigrants based
on a finding that the statute was inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 01 The Court analyzed the problem presented through the lens of
both Equal Protection and Due Process analysis.102 The Court found that
although public education was not a right granted in the Constitution, it
was not merely some governmental benefit, 03 as education has impor-
98 Judith Butler notes:
[O]n the one hand, the diagnosis [of GID] continues to be valued because it facili-
tates an economically feasible way of transitioning. On the other hand, the diagnosis
. . . continues to pathologize as a mental disorder what ought to be understood in-
stead as one among many human possibilities of determining one's gender for
oneself.
Butler, supra note 17, at 275.
99 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
10 See infra notes 108 to 113.
101 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-30 (1982).
102 See id. at 211-23.
103 Id. at 221.
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tance in helping to maintain the nation's basic institutions. '0 Further,
the Court noted that while illegal immigrants constitute a "shadow popu-
lation," they did not constitute a suspect class under the Equal Protection
Clause because the characteristic was not immutable but chosen.105 At
the same time, the Court noted that the children of illegal immigrants did
not have the same choice as their parents. 10 6 Concluding, however, that
the case did not implicate a fundamental right or a suspect classification,
the Court applied a level of scrutiny that was previously unseen: asking
whether the statute furthered "some substantial goal of the state."107
Both the courts and scholars have called into question the continu-
ing viability of Plyler's analysis. 108 Plyler appears to have blended ra-
tional basis review with intermediate scrutiny to create a level of scrutiny
that falls between the two traditional standards of review. 109 In Kadrmas
v. Dickinson Public Schools, " 10 the Supreme Court refused to extend Ply-
ler to reach the problem of an imposed user fee on children who wished
to use buses to and from public school."' Further, even Chief Justice
Burger observed in Plyler that "the Court's opinion rests on such a
unique confluence of theories and rationales that it will likely stand for
little beyond the results in these particular cases."' 1 2 Scholars such as
Hiroshi Motumura suggest that the decision likely has little relevance
beyond education and children.i11
Yet a body of case law and scholarship exists suggesting that Plyler
may have viability beyond its immediate context. For instance, a federal
district court used Plyler when considering California Proposition 187-
a voter initiative that denied public education to undocumented migrant
children.l 14 Plyler seizes on an argument set out in San Antonio v. Rod-
riguez, in which Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion advocates view-
104 Id.
105 Id. at 219 n.19.
106 Id. at 220.
107 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224 (1982).
108 See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Forward to the Past: The Many Meanings of Plyler v.
Doe on Its 25th Anniversary 3-6 (Apr. 14, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
www.law.berkeley.edu/files/HiroshiMotomuraFINAL.pdf.
109 Id. at 3.
1lo 487 U.S. 450 (1988).
111 Id. at 459.
112 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 243 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
113 See Motumura, supra note 108, at 6 ("It was apparently the unique combination of
education and children in Plyler that triggered a finding of constitutional rights."); see also
Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59
DuKE L.J. 1723, 1731 (2010) ("The Court's equal protection rationale-especially its applica-
tion of intermediate judicial scrutiny-relied so heavily on the involvement of children and
education that no court has ever used it to overturn a statute disadvantaging unauthorized
migrants outside the context of K-12 public education.").
114 League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1255-56
(C.D. Cal. 1997).
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ing the relationship between equal protection and due process as a
"spectrum" in which the intensity of review depended on the importance
of the constitutional interest and the invidiousness of the classifica-
tion.11 5 This formulation is often described as "sliding-scale" review." 6
Kenneth Karst argues that a purely categorical approach to under-
standing the Fourteenth Amendment fails to consider the complexity of
equal protection and due process analyses."' 7 Instead, the Court does not
engage a strict three-tiered review, and "despite the emerging rhetoric of
categories, the actual decision of cases had resulted from an exceedingly
fluid inquiry in which the level of justification demanded of the govern-
ment varied with the importance of the interests invaded and the degree
to which the government had imposed burdens on disadvantaged
groups." 18 Similarly, in studying Lawrence v. Texas and its effects on
due process analysis, some scholars have argued that there is more elas-
ticity and flexibility in substantive due process, rather than a rigid classi-
ficatory framework.'1 9 Consequently, rather than viewing it as an outlier
in a strain of cases applying a constrained system of classification, Plyler
is emblematic of a shifting terrain, in which the Court's evaluation of
rights can recognize the intersection of due process and equal protection
interests.
B. Application of Plyler to the Present Case
The right to hormone therapy in prisons for transgender persons
likely fits into the paradigm established in Plyler, in that it represents the
intersection between a quasi-fundamental right and a quasi-suspect class.
There are important reasons to resolve the problem of transgender rights
in this manner. Although transgender individuals likely would not be
considered a suspect class, they might represent a class that closely ap-
proximates a suspect class, based on the prongs that courts ordinarily
consider to make such a determination.12 0 Further, as noted earlier, the
right to sexual autonomy in self-definition, though not a fundamental
right, implicates important factors that suggest that it should be consid-
ered a quasi-fundamental right.121
115 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also
Kenneth Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55
UCLA L. REv. 99, 138 (2007) (describing Marshall's view of equal protection analysis).
116 See, e.g., Wayne McCormack, Lochner, Liberty, Property, and Human Rights, 1
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 432, 472 (2005).
117 Karst, supra note 115, at 138.
118 Id.
119 See, e.g., Nad D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. R~v 1103, 1118 (2004).
120 See infra Section BI.B..
121 See infra Section U.B.2.
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There are several reasons why resolving the conflict with this solu-
tion is ideal. First, this solution avoids the obvious problem of consider-
ing the issue only through the lens of suspect classification, since
transgenderism likely would not be considered a suspect classification.
Further, this solution also resolves the problem of considering autonomy
in sexual identity a fundamental right-a legal argument that may not
even provide a solution for hormone therapy because prison officials
may not even be required to respect this right. Importantly, while prisons
are not required to respect all fundamental rights, courts require more
stringent obedience to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.122 Finally, unlike appeals made based on the Eighth Amend-
ment, this approach does not utilize the language of deformity or
abnormality.
1. Why Does Transgenderism Constitute a Quasi-Suspect
Classification?
Traditionally, in order to determine whether or not a given group
should be considered a suspect class, courts have looked to whether there
is a history of discrimination,12 3 whether the trait described is visible, 12 4
whether the characteristic is immutable,125 whether the difference is a
"real difference" (meaning a difference that relates to the ability to "per-
form or contribute to society"),1 2 6 whether the group described is a dis-
crete and insular minority, 127 whether stereotypes regarding the group
exist,12 8 whether the group is underprivileged, 12 9 and whether there is
gross unfairness in the classification. 13 0 While it is clear that transgender
persons fulfill a great many of these factors, they fail to fulfill all of
them, suggesting that transgender persons qualify as a quasi-suspect
class.
122 See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) ("[Rlacial segregation, which is unconsti-
tutional outside prisons, is unconstitutional within prisons, save for 'the necessities of prison
security and discipline.'") (quoting Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968)).
123 See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 724 (9th Cir. 1989).
124 See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Pre-
sumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 108 YALE L.J. 485, 496 (1998) (noting the
importance of visibility in determinations of suspect classifications).
125 See id. at 725.
126 See id. (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)).
127 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
128 See id.
129 See San Antonio Indep. School. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (asking, to
determine whether a group is a suspect class, whether it is "saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process").
130 See id. at 724.
2011] 825
826 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20:807
First, there is a history of discrimination against transgender per-
sons. This is clear because, even in the present day, transgender persons
face many legal obstacles. Workplace discrimination of transgender in-
dividuals is common, and many transgender individuals are fired when
they transition on the job. 131 Throughout the twentieth century, trans-
gender individuals have also faced housing discrimination and have been
the victims of hate crimes. 132
In addition, transgender individuals fulfill several other relevant fac-
tors. The group clearly constitutes a discrete and insular minority: one in
eighteen thousand males and one in fifty-four thousand females are esti-
mated to be transgender.13 3 Furthermore, stereotyping about transgender
individuals is prevalent in American society. Seen both as abnormal and
threatening the sexuality of straight men, the gender transgression of
transgender persons often makes them the subject of jokes in the public
media. 134
The underprivileged status of transgender persons is well-docu-
mented. As noted above, transgender persons are overrepresented in the
prison population.135 Moreover, prejudice against transgender persons
often presents significant barriers to obtaining necessary medical care. 136
The prevalence of HIV in the transgender community is high, compared
to the general population,' 37 as is the prevalence of other health-related
problems.' 38 Further, transgender persons have difficulty finding
131 See Broadus, supra note 41, at 93.
132 See How Do Transgender People Suffer from Discrimination?, Hum. RTs. CAMPAIGN,
http://www.hrc.org/issues/1508.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
133 Seil, supra note 29, at 100.
134 See, e.g., Human Rights Campaign Sends Letter Condemning CBS Late Show with
David Letterman Skit, Asks for Apology, Hum. RTs. CAMPAIGN, Jan. 6, 2010, http://
www.schaap.hrc.org/news/13903.htm (discussing skit making fun of Amanda Simpson, a
transgender woman appointed to a senior position in the U.S. Department of Commerce); see
also Regine Labossiere, Media Image of Transgendered Evolves, SEATILE TIMES, June 21,
2007, http://seattletimes.nwsource.comlhtmlliving/2003755693_transgender2l.html (noting
the presence of the "Jerry Springer phenomenon," where transgendered people were "por-
trayed as freak shows").
135 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
136 Emily Newfield et al., Female to Male Transgender Quality of Life, 15 QuALYTY OF
LIFE REs. 1447, 1448 (2006) (demonstrating diminished quality of life in female-to-male
(FTM) transgender persons in comparison with the general population).
137 See Gretchen P. Kenagy, Transgender Health: Findings from Two Needs Assessment
Studies in Philadelphia, 30 HEALTH & Soc. WORK 19, 20 (2005).
138 Cf id. (including violence, depression, and lack of access to health care).
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work1 3 9 and, experience disproportionate levels of harassment and
abuse. 140
The question, however, of whether transgenderism is visible and
mutable is more difficult to answer. The trait is visible to the extent that
one makes it visible: if one decides to manifest "felt gender" 14 1 by cross-
dressing and taking hormones, then felt gender is perceptible to the pub-
lic. Alternatively, if a transgender individual never manifests felt gender
through any external expression, then transgenderism is not visible. Mu-
tability is even more complicated than the question of visibility. To the
extent that transgender persons can change their physical appearance,
transgender identity is indeed mutable. However, the definition of being
transgender is not in the physical appearance that one manifests but, ar-
guably, in the gender that one feels that one is. Thus, to the extent that
transgender persons cannot eliminate feelings that their body is contrary
to their actual gender, the characteristic is immutable. Recent evidence
suggests that feelings that one's body does not comport with one's felt
gender may be biological, meaning that such feelings are themselves im-
mutable.14 2 The question of mutability, then, is decidedly complex and
requires carefully evaluating what the examined class is.
After examining the factors the courts prescribe, it appears that
transgender persons satisfy some but not all of the characteristics of a
suspect class. 14 3 As a practical matter, Romer suggests that transgender
persons likely would not be considered a suspect class,144 given the treat-
ment of homosexuals. As a result, the most likely home that transgender
individuals might find in the Equal Protection regime is as a quasi-sus-
pect class.
139 See David Valentine, "The Calculus of Pain": Violence, Anthropological Ethics, and
the Category Transgender, in LOCAL ACTIONs: CULTURAL AcTIvisM, POWER, AND PUBLIC
LIFE IN AMERICA 89, 90 (Melissa Checker & Maggie Fishman eds., 2004) (noting the diffi-
culty that transgender persons have in finding work in New York).
140 See id. at 92 (describing a recent survey by the Gender Public Advocacy Coalition that
found that almost sixty percent of transgender-identified people surveyed had experienced
some form of harassment or abuse).
141 The Author uses "felt gender" as a short-hand to refer to the gender that a transgender
person feels, believes, or knows is his or her true gender. Felt gender is distinct from one's
biological gender at birth.
142 See Frank P.M. Kruijver et al., Male-to-Female Transsexuals Have Female Neuron
Numbers in a Limbic Nucleus, 85 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 2034, 2034
(2000).
143 See supra notes 123-142 and accompanying text.
144 See supra Section III.A.
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2. Why Does Transgenderism Constitute a Quasi-Fundamental
Right?
As noted above, 145 several aspects of the fundamental rights regime
are applicable when considering the right to determine one's gender. In
Lawrence-which struck down a Texas statute that banned homosexual
sodomy as unconstitutional-the Court noted the importance of sexual
autonomy, stating that the law should respect sexuality, as "overt[ly] ex-
press[ed] in intimate conduct with another person."146 This formulation,
in concert with the language of Casey upholding the right to "define
one's own concept of existence" as a part of the fundamental rights re-
gime, suggests that the Court may recognize the concept of a fundamen-
tal right to self-definition in gender identity.147 However, given the
nature of the holding in Lawrence, which expressed the fundamental
right to sexual privacy in terms of a relationship to another, 14 8 the ground
upon which to stake a claim to sexual self-definition is more tenuous.
Syllogistically, Lawrence combined with Casey suggests that a funda-
mental right to sexual self-definition exists, meaning that, in practice, the
Court would likely recognize the existence of such a right as a quasi-
fundamental right.
3. Why Is Sliding Scale Review an Appropriate Home for
Transgender Rights?
Sliding scale reviewl49 is the level of review that makes the most
sense when dealing with issues of transgender rights. Transgender per-
sons may claim status as a quasi-suspect class because they are marginal-
ized in a myriad of ways, including in the workplace, social settings, and
in medical contexts.150 Equal protection under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment exists, in large, part to protect discrete and insular minorities,' 51 a
designation that includes the transgender prisoner population. 15 2 Moreo-
ver, transgender persons rely on the case law establishing fundamental
rights precisely because they are interested in a right to autonomy rather
than a claim of medical need, suggesting that the fundamental rights re-
145 See supra Section III.B.
146 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
147 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992).
148 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982).
149 Sliding scale review is described at supra note 107 and accompanying text. In the
context of the intersection of a quasi-suspect class and a quasi-fundamental right, sliding scale
review involves asking whether a regulation furthered "some substantial goal of the state"
when a case involves the intersection of a quasi-suspect class and a quasi-fundamental right.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982).
150 See supra Part III.B.l.
151 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
152 See supra notes 133 and 134 and accompanying text.
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gime is more appropriate than the Eighth Amendment as a source for
transgender prisoners' protection.153 Finally, from a tactical perspective,
including suspect classification and fundamental rights together is impor-
tant for the transgender rights movement: while the prison context is less
protective of fundamental rights, courts have a lengthy history of requir-
ing a high level of scrutiny when Equal Protection is involved in the
prison context. 154
C. Positive Obligations on the Part of the State
If transgender prisoners in need of hormone therapy constitute a
quasi-suspect class, does this impose an affirmative duty on the prison to
provide prisoners with hormone therapy? Traditional analysis of due
process and fundamental rights does not create positive rights to govern-
ment aid, "even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty,
or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the
individual." 155 However, the prison context imposes different standards
of care on prison officials for the inmate population compared with ordi-
nary civilian life. In the prison context, "when the State takes a person
into its custody . . . the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding
duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-be-
ing."1 56 The reasoning behind this duty is that a state exceeds the sub-
stantive boundaries of the Due Process Clause and the Eighth
Amendment when "by affirmative exercise of its power [the state] so
restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for
himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human
needs-e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable
safety."' 5 7 Thus, the question remains as to why prison officials, given
this stringent standard, should be required to provide hormone therapy to
prisoners who require it, given that it does not rise to the level of a basic
human need.
The exercise of religious rights in prison, and prison officials' af-
firmative duty to provide materials to do so, may prove instructive in
analyzing the case of hormone therapy. An instructive parallel to hor-
mone therapy in prisons is found in Cruz v. Beto.158 In Cruz, the Court
examined the case of a Buddhist who was denied access to use the prison
153 See supra Part IlH.
154 See supra notes 49 and 118 and accompanying text.
155 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989); see
also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 124-25 (1996) (noting that "[iln numerous cases . . . the
Court has held that government 'need not provide funds so that people can exercise even
fundamental rights'").
156 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200.
157 Id. at 200.
158 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
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chapel even though inmates belonging to other religious sects were given
permission to use it.159 Though Cruz pre-dates Plyler, it is analogous
because it involves the interaction between a fundamental right and a
suspect class in the prison context-the exercise of religion by one relig-
ious group as compared to other religious groups. Significantly, like hor-
mone therapy in prisons, Cruz also involves the affirmative provision of
an entitlement, in this case, the use of the prison chapel. The Court
found that if Cruz, as a Buddhist, was denied a reasonable opportunity
afforded to fellow prisoners who adhered to more conventional precepts,
then the state discriminated on religious grounds.160
One lingering question remains: does the ruling in Cruz survive the
apparent policy shift that DeShaney's holding regarding prison officials'
obligations to inmates represents? Some district court cases suggest the
continuing viability of Cruz. In Rouser v. White,' 61 the court denied de-
fendants' summary judgment motion where the plaintiff alleged a consti-
tutional violation of the First Amendment when prison officials provided
amenities to other faith groups but failed to provide the plaintiff with a
Wiccan chaplain and a copy of a Witches' Bible.162 Perhaps more in-
structively, in Ward v. Walsh,163 the Ninth Circuit held that while a
prison had no affirmative duty to provide a Jewish prisoner with an or-
thodox rabbi, it might be required to provide kosher meals if, under the
appropriate analysis, the district court found on remand that the Turner
prongs did not support the abridgement of the right.' 6
As a consequence, there are circumstances in which, despite
DeShaney, prison officials are required to affirmatively provide prisoners
with certain goods and services, and the determination as to whether they
are required to do so is folded into the Turner inquiry that accompanies
159 Id.
160 Id. Another analogous example in which prison officials were required to provide a
service was in Bounds v. Smith, where the court noted that the fundamental constitutional right
of access to the courts required prison authorities to provide adequate law libraries in order to
assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal documents. 430 U.S. 817, 817
(1977). The nature of this holding and its applicability to the present situation, however, is
limited in that Bounds, although dealing with access to a privilege based on fundamental con-
stitutional rights, dealt with the provision of a service essential to the defense of a prisoner,
which imports different considerations than denial of a fundamental right wholly detached
from the duration or cause of imprisonment itself. See id.
161 630 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
162 See id. at 1165.
163 1 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1993).
164 See id. at 877-81. Note that the Turner prongs being referred to here are: (1) whether
there is a logical connection between the policy and the legitimate governmental interest that
justifies it, (2) whether the prisoner has alternative means to secure the right, (3) the impact
accommodation will have on guards and other prisoners, and on the allocation of resources
generally, and (4) whether there are ready alternatives to the prison's current policy that would
accommodate the inmate at de minimis cost to the prison. See id. at 876.
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fundamental rights analysis.' 6 5 Thus, the inquiry under sliding scale re-
view, as it applies in the prison context, would likely resemble the Tur-
ner inquiry, which determines whether a fundamental right will be
honored or abridged. As a result, while imposing a positive obligation
on prison officials may be a difficult task; precedent establishes that in
some cases, prison officials may be affirmatively required to supply a
good in order to secure the realization of certain rights.
CONCLUSION
The problem of transgender inmates' access to hormone therapy has
expressive effect beyond the confines of the prison. While hormone
therapy in the prison context has important implications for the inmate
population, within the broader context of the transgender community, the
way in which advocates frame legal arguments for hormone therapy will
shape society's perspective on transgender identity. While aligning most
closely with the traditional discourse of the transgender rights movement,
appeals to status as a suspect class or to access to hormone therapy as
part of a fundamental right are likely to fail. In addition, arguments that
rest on the grounds of medical need or handicap compromise autonomy
in self-definition.
While legality is often divorced from theory, this Note seeks to
square the theoretical underpinnings of transgenderism with the self-con-
ceptualization of the community, and to connect that framework to the
problem of transgender inmates' access to hormone therapy. This Note
began by providing a justification to analyze the problem and a back-
ground on the scope of the problem presented. Part II evaluated various
approaches to transgender rights and addressed their application to the
prisoners' rights context, before concluding that different problems are
inherent in each model. That section began by examining the ways in
which treating transgender identity as a suspect classification might help
the cause of transgender prisoners' rights to hormone therapy but ulti-
mately concluded that laws challenged by transgender individuals are un-
likely to receive more than rational basis scrutiny. The section next
analyzed the issue of fundamental rights, concluding that while courts
would likely consider autonomy in sexual self-definition a fundamental
right, the prison context affords only limited protection for the exercise
of fundamental rights. Finally, the section addressed the most common
doctrine applied to the problem of hormone therapy in prisons: the
Eighth Amendment. The section noted the problems with securing hor-
mone therapy through reliance on a theory that describes transgender
identity as the consequence of a mental disorder.
165 Id.
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Part III provided a novel solution to the problem of transgender
rights that effectively combined the three alternative approaches ex-
amined in Part II. This approach involves picking up the mantle of Ply-
ler v. Doe to describe transgender identity as an intersection of quasi-
fundamental rights and quasi-suspect classification that best reflects the
marriage of the transgender community's ideal self-definition and the
law as it exists today. The overall expressive effect of such an approach,
based not in language of deformity or disability but in the language of
protection from prejudice and access to rights, comports with the mission
of the transgender rights movement. Moreover, such an approach can
greatly affect other issues in the transgender rights movement, including
access to employment opportunities, protection from discrimination,
marriage rights, and name changes. Thus, sliding scale review can pro-
vide a solution both to transgender prisoners' rights to hormone therapy
and the larger problem of finding a home for transgender rights in consti-
tutional law.
